Some Reflections on Human Rights and Clerical Claims to Political Power by Reisman, M.H.A.
Some Reflections on Human Rights and
Clerical Claims to Political Power
M.H.A. Reismant
The Iranian revolution. American hostages in Iran. Hezbollah takes
hostages in Lebanon. Terrorists bomb an American marine compound in
Beirut. Hamas conducts a terror campaign in the West Bank and Gaza.
Ayatollah Khomeini sentences Salman Rushdie to death for his novel The
Satanic Verses. Terrorists bomb the World Trade Center.
Common to these events is an alleged Islamic religious inspiration. All
these events have stirred considerable interest in the West about the nature of
Islam as a religion and a political doctrine, and the impact it can have on
international law and politics and on individual lives in the West.
Many human rights organizations have reported violations of human rights
in some Islamic states. Violations of human rights are hardly unusual, but
perpetrators of these violations have justified them as required by and
consistent with Islamic law, culture, and values. Islam, they tell us, prescribes
unequal treatment of women and minorities and limitations on the freedom of
expression. Things have gone so far that the fate of millions of people in
Islamic states is beginning to be viewed as a per se human rights problem.'
A disengaged observer who intends to appraise the action or policy of any
government, political elite, or group cannot simply examine whether that
particular act or policy is compatible with the "true" or "fundamental" values,
religious or cultural, of that group. Such an exercise may be useful as
religious guidance for members of that particular group, but is irrelevant to
international appraisal. As one scholar put it recently:
The legal and political practices of any group - majority or minority, state or non-state,
t The author is a legal scholar with an interest in international and comparative law. This Comment
is adapted from a speech delivered at the Yale Law School on November 6, 1993 for a conference entitled
Law, Culture, and Human Rights, sponsored by the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human
Rights. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Michael Reisman.
1. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT: 1988 (1988); MIDDLE EAST WATCH,
GUARDIANS OF THOUGHT: LIMrrs ON FREEDOM OF ExPRESSIoN IN IRAN (1993); see also Report of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 18th mtg. at 57-62,
U.N. Doc. A/48118 (1993); Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
by the Special Representatives of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Agenda
Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/41 (1993) [hereinafter Final Report]; E.S.C. Res. 62, U.N. ESCOR,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 192-94, U.N. Doc. E/1993/23 (1993); Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Coimnents of the Human Rights Committee, 48th Sess.,
1260th mtg. at 2-5, U.N. Doc. CCPRICI791Add.25 (1993) [hereinafter HRC Comments]; Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States Parties UnderArticles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 20th mtg., U.N.
Doc. EIC.121199317 (1993).
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territorially or non-territorially based, whether it be the United States, China, or Iran,
Christian, Islamic, Jewish or Hindu fundamentalist... - can no longer be insulated from
appraisal simply and exclusively by invoking talismanic terms like "sovereignty," "domestic
jurisdiction," "tradition," "history," the supposed wills of assorted divinities, "the way we
have always done things," "nonpollution," "autonomy," or as alleged preconditions for
"group continuity." . . . mhe practices of all groups must be appraised in terms of the
international code of human rights. Deviations from that code do not signal the termination
of the group, but will lead to the insistence that the discrepant practices be adjusted to
conform with international standards.2
This Comment concerns the clergy's claim to political power; it concerns the
ftatisation, or collectivization, of religion. The question is, may a group
claiming to exercise the international human right of freedom of religion
engage in practices that violate other human rights? The answer is relevant for
dealing with cults and fundamentalist groups in the United States as well as
in Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, or India.
A word of caution: it is difficult and perilous to generalize Islamic,
Christian, Jewish, Hindu, or Buddhist values.' Scriptures of all the great
religions contain broad language and lend themselves to various or even
contradictory interpretations. And as with any type of interpretation, any
serious discussion of religion and religious values must take into account the
aspirations of the communicator and the elite who propagate and advocate
those values.
Any ideology that uses coercive or persuasive means is ultimately about
"who gets what, when and how" and falls within the realm of politics. There
is no reason that religious ideologies should be treated differently. Human
rights function as a critical theory for appraising how power is used. From the
human rights perspective, what counts is the treatment of individual human
beings, regardless of the origin of the authority sanctioning the treatment.
There is nothing in human rights law, whether or not codified, that justifies
the violation of human rights based on an alleged divine revelation. If
anything, the human rights movement has historically sought to protect the
dignity of individuals from unreasonable claims by those exercising power,
whether under the name of the King, the Church, some self-appointed junta,
or a secular ideology.
One of the great accomplishments of the contemporary human rights
movement has been to confer on the international community the competence
to determine whether a human right violation has occurred. The international
community makes such determinations in accordance with international
standards, standards that transcend national, cultural, and religious
boundaries. The substantial attenuation of the domain reserved to the domestic
jurisdiction of states is essential to any guarantee of human rights. Since the
2. W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103 YALE L.J.
401, 416 (1993).
3. See EDWARD SAID, COVERING ISLAM X (1981) (warning that one should not have "single" view
of Islam and project it over 800 million people who happen to be Muslim).
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adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, numerous
international instruments have codified human rights norms. The rights
embodied in the International Bill of Rights are generally considered basic
human rights. These are the rights that are claimed by individuals against their
governments and are supported by the international community.
In 1948, the entity to be controlled was government because it was the
only apparatus that had at its disposal the power to implement or violate
human rights norms. The focus on government still dominates human rights
law, but the situation is beginning to change. Governments, confronted by
armed opposition operating from within or outside the state and waging
guerrilla or civil war, increasingly contend that their opponents' behavior
should also be measured against human rights norms. Such claims, which are
gaining credence and sympathy, begin to acknowledge that governments are
no longer - if they ever were - the only entities with the power to violate
human rights. Some groups that espouse religious ideology like the Hamas or
Hezbollah, and some others that embrace a secular ideology like the Shining
Path, can do an awfully good job at violating human rights. I submit that
claims to power by the clergy of any religion, like the elite of any other
group, be judged by basic international human rights standards. Allowances
should not be made for cultural pluralism. Accepting justifications based on
cultural pluralism would deny the universality of claims of all human beings
to dignity. It would conflict with the premise of the international human rights
movement: that there are certain human values demanded by all human
beings, regardless of their cultural or religious heritage, race, or gender. In
the rest of this Comment, I will apply this general premise to claims to power
by the so-called fundamentalist Muslim clergy.
I
The notion of church and state as distinct and independent institutions
with their own laws is essentially a late Christian development.4 Islam views
life in its totality and purports to provide guidance for every aspect of human
life. It recognizes no divisions among the spiritual, social, economic, and
political sectors of life. No aspect of life is any less important to enhancing
the worship of God. Islam thus cannot leave outside its domain the affairs of
the state and the exercise of official power. Those who claim that Islam does
not recognize a separation between religion and government often invoke the
following passage from the Koran:
0 ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in
authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the
messenger if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more
4. BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM AND THE WEST 179 (1993).
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seemly in the end.'
Thus, classical Islam does not distinguish between godly matters managed by
Muslim clergy and earthly matters managed by others with no credentials to
interpret the divine revelation.6 The Christian injunction, "Render unto
Caesar those things that are Caesar's and unto God those things that are
God's,"7 is alien to classical Islam. Theoretically, a Muslim political leader
must qualify as a religious leader.8 This philosophical basis of Islam was
important in the early formation of Islamic constitutional theory. The political
power of caliphs who built the Islamic empire after Mohammed lacked
legitimacy unless it was thought to be sanctioned by God and in furtherance
of compliance with divine commandments. In this system, constitutional
authority is derived from God and not from the people. Predictably, those
with the power to interpret God's messages have enjoyed great power.
This classical Islamic theory of legitimacy and authority is essential to
grasping the political theory and practice of Islamic fundamentalism. The
theory was first used by some of the conquered territories to break away from
the authority of the caliph. Under Islamic law, the territories could not wage
war simply to gain power, or in this case, independence. Any claims against
the caliph - whether inspired by nationalism, political rivalry, or demand for
social change - had to be justified on the ground that the caliph had violated
the true spirit of Islam.9 Religion thus became the cornerstone of many
nationalistic and other political movements in the Islamic world. 1o
The second fundamentalist movement in Islam, which occurred at the turn
of this century, was also inspired by nationalism and the demand for
decolonization. Again, Islam was used in its political form - this time to
justify the ousting of Christian infidels from Muslim lands, to demand
decolonization from Western colonial powers. This movement, like its
predecessor, used symbols familiar to the masses and invoked the preservation
and return to "true Islamic" values to justify the revolt.
Contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is also inspired by nationalism, but
5. KoRANIV:59, translated in THE GLORIous KORAN 109 (Muhammad MarmadukePickthall trans.,
1976) [hereinafter PICKTHALL].
6. See M.H.A. Reisman, Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Impact on International Law and Politics,
in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (Mark W. Janis
ed., 1991).
7. Matthew 22:21.
8. In practice, the Islamic empire after Mohammed's death was built by caliphs - supreme political
and religious leaders. Some caliphs, however, were considered usurpers of power. Their authority initially
remained unchallenged because in Islamic dogma, there is a direct relationship between God and the
individual Muslim: a Muslim does not need the assistance of a clergyman to worship God. As a result of
this direct relationship, there was no need for the establishment of a church hierarchy, which in turn might
have determined whether or not the behavior of the caliphs was compatible with divine commandment.
9. These claims against the caliph as well as those of separatist movements, could be characterized
as claims to "decolonization," as that term is used in contemporary political and legal parlance. The
Islamic empire was indeed experiencing decolonization; references to the "true" Islam and "true" Islamic
values were simply justifications, fagades.
10. I have developed this view more extensively elsewhere. Reisman, supra note 6, at 112-13.
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it is distinct from the previous two movements. While the first two movements
used the claim of compliance with and return to a true Islam to justify their
defiance, they were not truly inward-looking: they sought a break from the
present, but aspired for a future in which the newly independent Islamic
governments would adopt key values more or less similar to those for which
the central colonial power purported to stand. In contrast, third generation
Islamic fundamentalism is inward-looking: it demands a return to a distant
utopian past. This is a material change with, perhaps, considerable
consequence. Contemporary fundamentalism not only considers technical,
socio-economic, and political changes as a direct threat to Islam and the
Islamic way of life, but also assumes that these changes have been designed
with an intention to so threaten Islam.
One must be careful not to equate fundamentalist political ideology with
all of Islam. Although theoretically no separation exists between church and
state in Islam, in reality and particularly in the last century, the main
orthodoxy - sometimes with uneasiness - has reconciled itself to remaining
at least partially outside the state apparatus. The Muslim clergy, however,
never withdrew their claim to what they believed to be their rightful authority;
rather, they have used that claim to bargain with the state. Fundamentalists"
find that bargaining unsatisfactory and refuse to compromise. However, their
views do not fall within the mainstream of Islam, nor are they consistent with
the general beliefs held by ordinary Muslims or preached by many Muslim
scholars and theologians.
Fundamentalism is not unique to Islam, nor does Islam uniquely
encourage fundamentalism. It is the economic, social, and political
environment that encourages the formation of forces for change - sometimes
minor and at other times radical. Islamic fundamentalism is like any other
form of mystical or secular religion that can be used as a force for the
political mobilization of people and as an instrument of socio-economic and
political change. Nevertheless, it would be delusory or deceitful to minimize
the authentic indigenous character of Islamic fundamentalism. Islam is more
than Islamic fundamentalism, but Islamic fundamentalism is one authentic
expression of Islam.
II
Muslim fundamentalists select the values they advocate from among the
authoritative sources of Islamic law and culture. The most sacred text in Islam
is the Koran. The Koran is the primary source of holy law and, like any other
great constitutional document, it is replete with ambiguous and general
11. By fundamentalism, here, I refer to the insistence, as a religious duty, on the exclusive exercise
of political power for religious ends. For a different view of fundamentalism, see MARTIN RIESEBRODT,
PIOUS PASSION 15-20 (Don Reneau trans., 1993).
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statements subject to various interpretations. It contains statements that could
be interpreted to sustain the view that Islam is a tolerant and adaptable
religion, compatible with change and consistent with international human
rights standards.' 2 The Koran also contains statements that can lead to the
conclusion that Islam is a rigid and unforgiving religion, built on intolerance
of diversity.
The second source of Islamic law and tradition is Sunna, or accounts of
experiences of Mohammed and his companions. Even here one encounters
nuances that could lead to conflicting interpretations. To organize and
interpret this immense body of traditions, the concept of Ijma, or consensus,
was developed. ljma allows the pious, the learned, and the politically relevant
to interpret Islamic law and formulate standards of behavior for situations not
directly covered by the law. Some Muslim scholars contend that Ijma did not
exist during early stages of the development of Islam. Rather, the principle of
Ijtehad required all Muslims, in situations for which there were no explicit
rules, to familiarize themselves, through personal inquiry, with the core of
Islam and to decide, through logical reasoning, on the appropriate course of
conduct. It was only after Islam expanded to distant territories and cultures
that the principles of Ijma, limiting the democratic competence of
interpretation to a small group, replaced jtehad.'3
The fundamentalist vision of government is theocratic. The authority of
an Islamic government does not derive from popular support of the governed
people, but from God. Humans do not have the authority to change God's
laws. In executing the laws, humans must take great care to maintain their
purity. Only those individuals who have dedicated their lives to worshipping
God and studying his wishes are capable of so executing God's laws. Thus,
the wishes of a people - even its majority - if inconsistent with God's laws,
are theoretically irrelevant to social planning. Fundamentalist governments are
separated into three branches, not to maintain a system of checks and
balances, but simply to facilitate management of affairs. Indeed,
fundamentalists recognize no separation of functions in godly matters. Checks
and balances are unnecessary, perhaps impossible, given that God's wishes
supersede everything else.
12. For example, some Islamic Shi'a scholars have argued that the institution of temporary marriage
is a more progressive way to deal with the sexuality of young people than the Western "free love." See
AYATOLLAH MURTIZA MUTAHHARI, HOUGHOUG ZAN DAR ISLAM [THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN
ISLAM] (1974) (Farsi), quoted in Shahla Haeri, Temporary Marriage and the State in Iran: An Islamic
Discourse on Female Sexuality, 59 Soc. REs. 201, 219-21 (1992). See generally SAYID H. AMIN, ISLAMIC
LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MODERN WORLD 51-81 (1989); GHASSAN MAAROUF ANAoUT,
ASYLUM IN THE ARAB-IsLAMIC TRADITION (1987); ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
TRADITION AND POLITICS (1981); JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW (1964); Cherif
M. Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 609 (1980); Amyn Sajoo,
Islam and Human Rights: Congruence or Dichotomy?, 4 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 23 (1990).
13. The other important source of Islamic law is Qiyas for Sunnis and Aql for Shi'as. Qiyas, or
comparison, is the application of the norms drawn from a case to another similar case by analogy. Aql,
or reason, is rational argument.
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Fundamentalists admit, with a certain uneasiness, that their system of
government is not democratic. 14 The basis of democracy rests on the will of
the majority of a people; the basis of an Islamic government rests on divine
authority. A majority vote or some other indication of the people's approval
is, theoretically, unnecessary and irrelevant to establishing or maintaining the
legitimacy of an Islamic government. Many fundamentalist leaders share this
theory of government. For example, one Islamic scholar, Abu-Ali Modoudi,
sees the people's only role as interpreting laws during their application and
deciding on matters for which there are no divine laws.15 When there is a
clear and direct order from God, not even all the Muslims on earth can
modify or change the law. Modoudi restricts even the limited competence to
interpret laws to those Muslims who have reached the level of Ijtehad.
Ordinary Muslims or minority religious people cannot participate in the affairs
of an Islamic government. To justify this interpretation, Modoudi points to the
inability and weakness of the human soul. He argues that human beings often
submit to short-term desires because they cannot appreciate their own interest
in following divine orders. They therefore need a political regime that protects
their interest and well-being and ultimately saves them from their worst
enemy, themselves.
Ali Shariati, another Islamic scholar, has expressed the same view. He
does not speak of the weakness of human nature or invoke so explicitly the
supremacy of divine law, but he reaches similar conclusions about the political
nature of government. He sees people as basically divided into two political
groups: those who guide the way to understanding and tawheed, or
monotheism, 6 and those who follow. Each of these two groups has its own
responsibilities within the larger category of leaders and followers. Ayatollah
Khomeini and his followers have a comparable vision of an Islamic
government.' 7 The Khomeinist Iranian constitution establishes a Vali-Faghih,
or maximum leader. The Vali-Faghih is not directly elected by the people but
has the ultimate power over the three branches of government. His authority
under the constitution is not ceremonial but actual. The constitution
institutionalizes the influence of the clergy over the affairs of the state in other
14. See, e.g., ABU-ALI MODOUDI, TEORI SIASI ISLAM [THE POLITICAL THEORY OF ISLAM] 3-5
(Mohammad Mehdi Hydarpour trans. from Arabic, 1978) (Farsi).
15. Id.
16. See ALI SHARIATI, HAJI 27 (Ali A. Behzadnia & Najla Denny trans., 1977).
17. In his book Islamic Government, Ayatollah Khomeini states:
We [the clergy] must benefit, from people with scientific and technical specialization in
connection with statistical, administrative and organizational works. As for the supreme state
administration and for spreading justice, providing security, establishing just social relations,
for judiciary affairs and for dispensing justice among the people, this is the jurisdiction of the
jurisprudent and the thing on which the jurisprudent spends all his life. The jurisprudent
possesses that which safeguards the people's freedom, independence and progress within a
straight policy in which foreigners have no influence and which does not swerve to the right
or to the left.
AYATOLLAH RuHOLLAH KHOMEINI, ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT 105 (1979).
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respects as well.'"
I
Fundamentalists have selected their professed values from early Islam.
Those values, to the extent that they have been articulated and are identifiable,
are not all inconsistent with those accepted in the present global community.
Fundamentalists are not necessarily anti-scientific. They do not prohibit the
intervention of science to save, improve, or extend human life. They do not
advocate a primitive lifestyle. Fundamentalist values, however, conflict in
important respects with modern Western values, in particular, those reflected
in international human rights standards: fundamentalism demands, and
constantly tests, the total commitment of individual Muslims to God and to the
community of Muslims. The scope and the extent of individual rights, then,
is conditioned upon the welfare of the community of Muslims.
Muslim governments, even those that are not fundamentalist, have long
held the view that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 9 the
International Covenants,2" and other human rights instruments do not
adequately take into account the principles of Islamic law, culture, and values.
In 1948, delegates from Saudi Arabia and Egypt expressed doubts about the
universality of the human rights norms articulated in the Declaration on
Human Rights. Although seven out of the then-eight Muslim states ultimately
voted in favor of the Universal Declaration, they never withdrew their
reservations regarding universality.2 Even those states that have ratified the
International Covenants, when pressed on non-compliance with their terms,
quickly resort to the contention that the covenants do not take into account
Islamic custom and culture. Ostensibly in response to this lapse, in 1990, the
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers adopted the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam.' Although unquestionably inspired by the Universal
18. Under the Iranian constitution, the Guardianship Council, a group composed of twelve
individuals, oversees all the laws adopted by the parliament and tests their compatibility with Islamic
principles and the constitution. IRANIAN CONST. art. 91. The parliament has no legal validity without the
Guardianship Council, id. art. 93, which must approve all laws adopted by the parliament, id. art. 94. Half
of the Guardianship Council are members of the clergy selected by the Vali-Faghih, and the other half are
Muslim lawyers selected by the parliament. The former, however, have supremacy: the compatibility of
proposed laws with Islamic principles is determined only by majority vote of the six religious members,
while the compatibility of the same laws with the constitution is determined by majority vote of the entire
Guardianship Council. Id. art. 96.
19. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 994 U.N.T.S. 3.
21. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, 183d mtg. at 933, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948). Saudi Arabia
abstained from voting and since then has not participated in the negotiation of human rights instruments.
22. Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in Letter Dated 19 September 1990 from the
Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item II et al., at 200-07, U.N. Doc. A/451421 (1990).
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Declaration of Human Rights, the Cairo Declaration departs significantly from
the declaration through the use of religious language; it expressly links
individual rights to the Islamic Shari'ah.?
Islamic fundamentalists have already encountered great difficulty with the
corpus of international human rights norms, for key parts of it are inconsistent
with their demands. 4 Fundamentalists resolutely resist policies that would
accord equal political rights to Muslims and non-Muslims.?5 Although Islam
recognizes certain other religions and tolerates their coexistence with Islam,
it does not allow the assignment to non-Muslims the power of policymaking
and the management of important Muslim affairs - both of which are deemed
to require deep Islamic conviction and divine authority. Indeed,
fundamentalists are not alone in rejecting the basic human rights principle26
of equality of political rights: most Muslim states have granted only limited
political rights to non-Muslims, and in many Muslim states, some government
posts can only be held by Muslims.27
Non-Muslim minorities are not the only ones suffering incursions on their
human rights. Muslims themselves face sharp limits on their individual
freedom. The limits are determined by the compatibility of any freedom with
Islamic principles. The limits, already considerable, are potentially
expandable, for there is no unanimity in Islamic jurisprudence on the exact
scope and content of all Islamic principles.2" Hence, individual freedom is
subject to vague and untested concepts, the content of which can change
significantly depending on the views of the person making the decision.
The dominance of community welfare over individual rights became
apparent last year in the U.N. Human Rights Committee's examination of
Iran's periodic report submitted in accordance with the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.29 When asked to explain Iran's non-compliance
with several provisions of the covenant, Iranian representatives answered that
the government was complying with a constitution that a majority of the
people had approved. They seemed to believe that the minority's rights were
limited to what the majority permitted. Government officials further assumed
that the majority, since they were Muslims, wanted compliance with Islam.
They thereby equated the upholding of Islam with the protection of majority
23. Id. pmbl. para. 2.
24. For example, the Sudan's Minister of Justice recently stirred controversy by describing a U.N.
human rights monitor's report as "satanic" and apparently threatening the monitor as an "enemy of Islam"
for criticizing laws based on the Koran. U.N. Aide and Sudan Clash on Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
8, 1994, at A12.
25. Indeed, Khomeini projected that Iranians, because of their lax attitude towards Islam, would one
day awaken to see themselves ruled by a Jew or a Christian.
26. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 19, art. 2.
27. In Pakistan, which has a moderate Islamic government, only Muslims can hold the post of the
president and the prime minister. CoNsTrrUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, arts. 41(2),
91(2).
28. Furthermore, the views of fundamentalists about Islamic principles do not, in many cases,
coincide with the majority view in Islam.
29. ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 40.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
rights, and justified limiting individual freedoms to ensure their compatibility
with Islamic principles."
Atheists and non-recognized religious minorities face the harshest
discrimination. Atheists are generally considered hopeless souls; those of
Muslim origin are criminals. The Iranian representative to the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that an essential
aspect of Iran's cultural policies is to "purify-] the human environment to
eliminate the causes of atheism."31 In less diplomatic language, Sheik
Mohammed al-Ghozali, Egypt's model of the mainstream Muslim cleric, when
asked whether people who espouse secular views should be punished,
answered: "[A] secularist represents a danger to society and the nation that
must be eliminated. . . .It is the duty of the government to kill him."32
For non-recognized religious minorities, the situation is even worse. The
persecution of Baha'is in Iran is well documented. In 1990, when asked about
the Baha'is before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Iran denied that the Baha'is were a religious minority or even a minority.33
By 1993, government representatives modified that view and tried to explain
the maltreatment of the Baha'is in historical terms. Because the Baha'is were
the leftover of foreign domination, they were looked upon by ordinary people
with suspicion. This has led to maltreatment and government intervention to
maintain public order. 4
IV
Equality of sexes poses a particular dilemma for fundamentalists. Even
under the majority jurisprudence of Islamic law, men and women do not enjoy
equal rights. The basis for the inequality is derived from the Koran, which
states: "Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made the one of
30. See Second Periodic Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 46th
Sess., 1193d mtg. at 1 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1193 (1992) (stating that "in an Islamic country,
protection of Islamic morals was in line with the protection of public morals allowed as a restriction in the
Covenant").
31. U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 8th Sess., 7th mtg. 1 13, U.N.
Doc. EIC.12l19931SR.7 (1993) (summary record of meeting).
32. YoussefM. Ibrahim, Egypt Fights Militant Islam with More of the Same, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1993, at A3. The Sheik was testifying for the defense in the murder trial of some of the members of an
Islamic militant group accused of gunning down Farag Fodah, a well-known Egyptian writer. This group
apparently takes spiritual leadership from Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the Egyptian Muslim cleric who
was charged with conspiracy in the bombing of the World Trade Center. Tim Weiner, Blowbackfrom the
Afghan Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, § 6, at 53.
33. U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., 43d mtg. 1 17, U.N.
Doec. E/C.12/1990/SR.43 (1990).
34. Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special
Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, ESCOR, 49th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 12,
11 308-11, U.N. Doc. EICN.411993/41 (1993). A representative of Morocco expressed a similar view in
the Human Rights Committee. He stated that Islam recognizes revealed religions only; "[tihe Baha'i faith
did not qualify as such and was considered as a heretical sect of colonial origin." The Moroccan penal
code strictly prohibits all acts of proselytism: Baha'i services can only be held in private. U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 1 67, U.N. Doec. A/47140 (1992).
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them to excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the
support of women). So good women are the obedient .... " Women and
men symbolize different aspects of human life and have separate rights and
obligations. Women are viewed as complimentary to men, but not as equal to
them. Incidentally, this view of women is not unique to Islam or Muslim
fundamentalists. It is common in non-Muslim Third World states and even in
some industrialized Western democracies.
But Muslim fundamentalists, without apology, find their justification in
the divine design of creation: they do not have much trouble justifying their
gender bias in religious terms. Even under traditional Islamic law, women are
generally viewed as worth half their male counterparts:3 6 only a man has the
right to initiate divorce; a man has the right to marry four permanent wives
and maintain an infinite number of "temporary wives"; and a woman must
secure her husband's permission to work or travel abroad. The so-called
Islamic dress code in Iran obliges women "to dress in a manner which might
not be to their liking, to go to places where they might not wish to go and to
lead a life which they had not chosen. ""3 Those who refuse to comply with
the rules are arrested. In 1991, in the space of a few days, 800 Iranian women
were arrested for breaching the dress code and another 375 for not being
properly veiled.38 Despite the magnitude of non-compliance, Iranian officials
claim that Muslim women prefer to wear traditional clothing, that the dress
code is a moral and religious choice that they had freely made.39 When
pressed why the government then needed militia to impose the dress code on
women, one government representative stated:
The rules regarding dress code and conduct reflect[] and [are] intended to ensure respect for
the country's traditions and religious beliefs. . . . A parallel could be drawn with the
regulations against indecent exposure in a number of countries of Europe and the Americas.
The ultimate purpose of the regulations [is] to preserve society's order.'
Here again, one notes the underlying philosophical justification for restricting
individual rights for the sake of an unspecified common welfare of the Muslim
public order.
Gender discrimination is common among all contemporary Muslim
fundamentalists, not only in Iran but also in Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza,
and Algeria. Under fundamentalist pressure, most of the Islamic governments
35. KORAN IV:34, translated in PICKTHALL, supra note 5, at 104.
36. Thus the testimony of two women is equal to the testimony of a man, KORAN, 11:282;
compensation paid for the murder of a man is double that for the murder of a woman; and a woman's
share of inheritance is half that of a man. See generally Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Islamic Law,
International Relations and Human Rights: Challenge and Response, CORNELL INT'L L.J. 317 (1987).
37. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 46th Sess., 1194th mtg. 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1194
(1992) (comments of Professor Higgins).
38. Id.
39. Id. 48.
40. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 46th Sess., 1195th mtg. 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1195
(1992) (comments of Prado Vallejo).
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that ratified the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,4 did so with a reservation: they would
comply with the convention's provisions only to the extent that they
conformed with Islamic principles and Shari'ah.42
Fundamentalists who are not yet in power also practice gender
discrimination. During the 1991-92 Muslim uprising in Algeria, Ali Belhaj,
one of the leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front, is reported to have said that
the primary duty of women was to "bear good Muslims."43 Another Islamic
Salvation Front leader, Sheik Abkelkhader Moghni complained about women
working and taking jobs away from men; women he said, just "spend their
salaries on make-up and dresses, they should return to their homes."'
Variations of gender bias are characteristic of other religious fundamentalist
movements, such as the Sikhs, Hindus, Sinhalese,' and certain Christian
sects.46
Some Muslim scholars disagree with the thesis that Islam is gender
biased. They believe that the rights provided for women in Islam should be
considered in historical perspective and should be compared to the rights that
women enjoyed in the Arabian peninsula or in other parts of the world at
Islam's inception. Women's rights under Islamic law were superior to those
granted by the Romans or in the Arabian peninsula. Those rights, they argue,
should not be compared with contemporary rights of women.4'
V
Islamic fundamentalists have a simple conception of right and wrong. In
general, any disagreement with them puts one in the category of wrong. This
is partly because of their conviction of rectitude: they know the divine truth
and see no reason for compromise or even for tolerance of freedom of
expression in any form. Quite simply, they will not tolerate political
opposition to the fundamentalist program; freedom of the press is unnecessary
as is the freedom of assembly.
Denial of the freedom of expression in Iran has been amply
41. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 180,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34146 (1980).
42. Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden have stated that this reservation is
incompatible with the fundamental object and purpose of the convention. Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December 1992, at 170-72, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/ll
(1993).
43. MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR? RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM CONFRONTS THE
SECULAR STATE 169 (1993).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., JOAN DELFATTORE, WHAT JOHNNY SHOULDN'T READ: TEXTBOOK CENSORSHIP IN
AMERICA (1992).
47. See, e.g., Gamal M. Badr, Forward to MONA MIKHAIL, IMAGES OF ARAB WOMEN: FACT AND
FICTION 2 (1979).
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documented.4" The practice is not unique to Iran; it can be found in other
countries coming under the influence of Islamic fundamentalists. For example,
last summer fundamentalist professors at Cairo University denied tenure to a
professor of Arabic, claiming that his writings were heretical. A
fundamentalist lawyer then filed suit to force a divorce between the professor
and his wife, on the grounds that a Muslim woman could not be married to
a heretic.49 In another case, Al Azhar University, Islam's oldest theology
school, has banned novels by the Nobel Prize winner, Naguib Mahfouz, as
disrespectful of Islam.5 0 A fundamentalist group put the novelist at the top
of its death list because he refused to alter his views or apologize."1
The death sentence imposed by Ayatollah Khomeini on Salman Rushdie
is perhaps the most disturbing of all, because it indicates that fundamentalists
see no territorial limits when an issue concerns Islam. When pressed in the
United Nations on the incompatibility of Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa with
Iran's obligations under the International Covenants, Iranian officials tried to
dissociate Khomeini'sfatwa from the government. They tried to characterize
it as the view of a Mojtahed, or religious scholar.52 They acknowledged,
however, that the practice was permitted in Islam and that, once issued,
nothing could be done about it. They denied that the Iranian government had
an obligation to denounce thefatwa and make every effort to ensure that its
citizens do not interfere with the domestic affairs of another state.
VI
The theory and practice of the use of military power in Islamic
fundamentalism may prove to be its most disruptive feature to the present
system of international law. Under classical Islam, Jihad, or holy war, was
a defensive war. Many religious leaders have long held that the wars fought
by Mohammed during his lifetime were defensive. Without condemning
Islamic rulers, they conceded that most of the wars after Mohammed were
offensive. These wars were deemed to be for expansion for a "just cause."
Fundamentalists rely primarily on the just cause basis for Jihad and not so
much on whether the purpose is in preservation of justice or its expansion.
This ambiguity in their view about Jihad may derive from their revolutionary
perception of life and their messianic goals.
Even those fundamentalists who view the purpose of Jihad as non-military
force see the doctrine in an active and interventionist fashion. In its non-
48. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 1, 175-88.
49. The court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Terri Theiss, Cairo Divorce Case, CHRISTIAN
SCl. MONrTOR, Jan. 28, 1994, at 24.
50. Ibrahim, supra note 32, at A3.
51. Id.
52. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., 1230th mtg. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1230
(1993).
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military aspect, Jihad encourages people to do good deeds and avoid wrong
deeds. To march on God's path, a Muslim must be active, attempt to get
involved in other people's lives, and suffer and face danger for that
purpose.53
A war for "just cause" does not have a territorial limit. Therefore, when
an action or a person is presumed to pose a threat to Islam, irrespective of
territorial location or nationality, that action or person becomes subject to the
jurisdiction of fundamentalists, as did Salman Rushdie. Moreover, those who
wage a just war are not limited in the methods they may utilize: under the
concept of just war, the legality of the use of power is tested by reference to
the purpose for the use rather than the methods in which that power is used.
Such discretion is inconsistent with international humanitarian and human
rights standards.54
The use of violence is not limited to Islamic fundamentalists but is
characteristic of any revolutionary movement. Religious movements may find
it easier to justify violence; they can furnish moral sanction and thereby more
easily release any social and personal inhibition in the candidate selected to
perform the violence. Sanctioning great violence for "just war" in Islam has
analogues in Christian, Jewish, and other traditions.55 Religious radical
movements apparently can always find something in their religious tradition
to justify and sanction violence. The late Rabbi Meir Kohane, calling on the
people of Israel to rise up and reclaim the West Bank in a just war, argued
that defense was not the only religious basis for warfare: "National pride was
also a legitimate reason."56 A right-wing Jewish leader reportedly stated,
"We believe in collective justice. " ' Such a concept would sanction
indiscriminate violence against individuals belonging to the so-called enemy
group. Palestinians in the intifada have also justified the use of violence by
expanding the Islamic legal concept of self-defense.5" Even Buddhist
activists, despite their strong aversion to killing, have found a religious
sanction for violence. 59
53. SHARIATI, supra note 16.
54. Fundamentalists' approach to the use of power is shaped by their belief that they represent a
minority: like other radical revolutionary movements, they fear that their survival depends upon who
destroys whom first. Thus, when someone errs, fundamentalists use whatever force they feel necessary.
In punishing offenders, they show little compassion and, predictably, develop very poor records on due
process. See HRC Comments, supra note 1, 12 ("The committee also deplores the lack of respect for
due process of law, particularly before the revolutionary courts, where trials in camera tend to be the rule
and where apparently no real possibility is provided to the accused to prepare a defence. The lack of an
independent Bar Association also has an adverse effect on the administration of justice, in the view of the
Committee.") (on Iran).
55. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 43, at 164.
56. Id. at 165.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 166.
59. The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka was killed by a Buddhist monk. Id. On the use of violence
committed in the name of religion, see generally JAMEs A. HAUGHT, HOLY HORRORS: AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS MURDERS AND MADNESS (1990).
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VII
History can teach and help us avoid costly mistakes. Ample painful
examples show that mixing religion and politics creates great misery. These
examples are not limited to Islam, but are found in nearly all the religions of
the world. In fact, the experiment of Christian government led to bloody
revolts to take religion out of government. There is no reason to believe that
Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, or Sikh governments will fare differently. Indeed,
in historical perspective, the views and actions of current Islamic movements
and governments seem very familiar. Alas the consequences, too, will be
familiar. Religious governments will marginalize international standards on
human rights and subordinate them to religious values as enunciated by
particular political elites. One of the first casualties will be the achievements
of decades of painstaking efforts of humanists and human rights advocates.

